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The determinants of domestic and cross border 
bank contagion risk in Southeast Asia* 
Carlos Bautista, Philippe Rous and Amine Tarazi** 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of both domestic and cross border systemic risk for 8 countries in 
Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand). We use weekly data on individual bank stock prices from 2000 to 2005 to construct 
bank contagion measures based on the exponential weighted average correlations of the residuals 
of the market model. Our results show that average pair-wise correlations significantly differ 
among countries and that the probability that a specific shock extends to other banks is better 
explained by asset risk indicators and market based risk measures, such as systematic risk, for 
cross country contagion. In contrast, for domestic contagion, liquidity risk indicators and bank 
opaqueness proxies perform better. Our findings suggest that whereas illiquidity, but not 
insolvency, is a major concern at the domestic level the opposite result holds for cross country 
contagion.  
Keywords: Bank contagion, systemic risk, Southeast Asia. 
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The determinants of domestic and cross border 
bank contagion risk in Southeast Asia 
1 Introduction 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis episode exposed the structural weaknesses of several East 
Asian economies. Structural reforms were initiated as soon as the effects of the crisis subsided to 
strengthen institutions that failed to protect the economy from the undesirable effects of the 
crisis. Crucial to these economies are their banking institutions which were at the forefront of the 
crisis. Attempts to correct these structural weaknesses especially in the banking sector of East 
Asian economies are currently being implemented especially in the area of bank regulation and 
supervision. It is hoped that with these changes, their economies are better prepared should 
similar systemic shocks hit the region in this post-crisis period. 
Prior to the Mexican and the Asian crises, structural adjustment problems in one economy 
remained within its borders and no one ever thought that contagion was a possibility and that it 
can occur with surprising speed. Immediately after the Asian crisis episode, the literature on 
systemic risk and contagion grew at a rapid pace as researchers and analysts scrambled to 
explain the nature of the events that lead to the massive system breakdown. Close to a decade has 
past and a large literature on the Asian crisis has deepened the understanding of the causes of the 
crisis and how it was propagated (See for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)). All the more 
in an increasingly integrated world, these studies have alerted policymakers that a crisis in one 
economy can be contagious. Thus, in the post-crisis era, the threat of systemic risk both at the 
regional level and within borders remains, if it has not increased. An area of research on 
contagion that has not been fully explored is concerned with systemic risk at the banking sector 
level in Asia. While banking sector systemic risk analysis is flourishing in advanced economies 
(See De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) or Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2006, forthcoming) and their 
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references), there are only a few studies on bank domestic contagion for the Asian region (See for 
example, Bystrom, (2004)).  
This paper’s task is to examine in detail, systemic risk in the banking sector of East Asia. In 
this study, the magnitude of banking sector systemic risk in each country is measured by the 
average correlation of bank equity returns, adjusted for market return movements (individual 
firm specific risk) using various techniques.1  
We focus on both domestic measures of potential systemic risk but also on cross-border 
indicators. Because our aim is to focus on the post-crisis period we consider the period 2000-2005. 
Further, we build a framework to assess the link between individual bank correlations and 
systemic (domestic or cross border) risk. To complete the analysis, the study attempts to explore 
the determinants of significant individual correlations using a large set of firm specific variables 
based on both accounting and market data.  
The paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly reviews the literature on 
systemic risk and discusses the issue as regards Southeast Asia. The third section outlines the 
method used by the study. The fourth section describes the data set and discusses the empirical 
results. The final section gives the conclusion. 
2 Systemic risks in the East Asian region 
Because of the complexity of the problem arising from systemic events, a variety of 
explanations have been put forth in an abundant literature. This can be gleaned from De Bandt 
and Hartmann (2000) who have conducted an extensive survey of systemic risk in general, 
                                                          
1 The dynamic conditional correlation model (DCC) of Engle (2002) and the rolling exponential weighted 
average correlations were the methods used in the estimation of the correlations. However because of 
computing constraints (missing observations for some banks in our sample and therefore incomplete series 
for DCC computations) and since the estimated correlations did not differ in terms of closeness to each 
other, the latter was chosen over the former. 
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covering both theory and empirical work.2 Accordingly, systemic risk can be defined broadly or 
narrowly, depending on whether it is the result of single (second round effects of shocks affect 
only one entity) or wide (second round effects of shocks affect many entities) systemic events. 
Systemic risk arises when systemic events of either kind adversely affect a large number of 
institutions and prevent the financial system from performing normally. 
The analysis of systemic risk in the empirical literature is conducted in several ways. For 
example, Schoenmaker (1996) makes use of autoregressive poisson regression on U.S. bank 
failure count data against macroeconomic variables and finds evidence of bank contagion. 
Worthington and Higgs (2004) use a multivariate GARCH model of the BEKK type and finds 
volatility spillovers in stock markets among some East Asian economies. Gropp and Vesala (2005) 
and Gropp and Moermann (2004), using a sample of European banks, have successfully used 
extreme value theory in isolating contagion in market data.  
The most popular method, especially in the analysis of the Asian crisis, is to measure 
contagion effects of an event affecting one or more entities on other entities. This may be done 
through correlation analysis - the method chosen by the present study – of either the equity 
returns or the exchange rates. One of the first articles on Asian crisis contagion is by Baig and 
Goldfajn (1998) who show elevated levels of exchange rate correlation during the crisis period. 
They take this as an indicator of contagion. A particularly influential paper on contagion during 
the Asian crisis is by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who showed that with appropriate adjustments 
to account for the increase in the volatility of variables during abnormal times, contagion cannot 
be detected and what is apparent is the usual interdependence of variables that are also present 
during normal periods. Recently, Corsetti et al (2005) showed that Forbes and Rigobon’s tests for 
contagion are too restrictive and lead to a bias for the hypothesis of no contagion. They suggest 
                                                          
2One could notice that their work largely describes the extensive literature on bank systemic risk in Europe 
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caution in taking increased correlation as an indicator of contagion and propose to test contagion 
using correlations that have accounted for the influence of the data generating process from a 
simple factor model.  
Attempts to explain the causes of the Asian crisis contagion itself have also been accomplished 
by researchers. It has been noted that prior to the crisis, the less developed economies embarked 
in financial and trade liberalization programs almost simultaneously in the early 1990s. Typically, 
these economies with wide savings investment gaps presented opportunities for investment in 
emerging market equities and encouraged cross border activities of developed country banks. 
The explanation of contagion hinges heavily on the notion of a common lender country. This 
leads to the ‘twin crisis’ sub-literature that attempts to disentangle the currency crisis from the 
banking crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) provide details on the common bank creditor as 
one of the transmission channels leading to the crisis aside from trade links and other liquidity 
channels. Sbracia and Zaghini (2001, 2003) expound on the role of both domestic and foreign 
banks in a country in the transmission of shocks during the Asian crisis. Complementing the 
results of Kaminsky and Reinhart, they list the stylized facts on the common lender channel that 
reflected a high degree of vulnerability of these economies. They then construct a vulnerability 
index for emerging market economies based on the common lender channel.  
It is clear from some papers that in the aftermath of the crisis, interest in the East Asian region 
is coming back. Hohl et al (2005) document the increase in cross border banking activity in Asia 
and warn anew of the dangers of systemic events, especially in light of reforms undertaken since 
the crisis of 1997. They describe how the Basel 2 framework can help address systemic risk in this 
regard. From this short review, it is clear that an analysis of systemic risk in Western banking 
(Europe and US) should be different from that of Asian banking sectors. There are a number of 
reasons for this. First, Western banks are quite sophisticated and mature enough such that their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and the U.S. and only a few citations on studies related to the Asian crisis. 
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role of translating savings to productive investments are well defined. Emerging market banks 
play the same role but more importantly, because of the wide savings - investment gap, it makes 
them ideal channels of foreign funds to fill in this gap. Thus while cross border banking activity 
in Europe is increasing because of more integration among national banks (primarily because 
savings-investment channels are being integrated across countries), cross border activity in the 
Asian region has more to do with the infusion of scarce funds to supplement domestic resources. 
Such cross border activity involves both foreign and domestic banks.3 As domestic banks mature 
and grow into sophistication in the post crisis period, the dangers of domestic systemic risk will 
surely rise aside from cross border systemic risk arising from common lender channels.  
3 Method 
In this paper, systemic risk potential is measured by correlations of stock returns which have 
proven to be suitable indicators in previous studies (De Nicolo and Kwast (2002)). We retain this 
type of approach because alternative measures based either on abnormal returns or on the 
correlations of Merton based distance to defaults are unable to reveal episodes of systemic risk 
during the post crisis period that we analyse (2000-2005)4.  
To control for market movements and country specific factors we focus on the correlations of 
the residuals of a market model rather than on the correlations of the stock returns5. Cross 
                                                          
3 One would suspect that the introduction of a common currency, the Euro, hastened this integration and 
growing interdependence among these European banks. 
4 As a preliminary step we considered negative abnormal returns by estimating market models on moving 
estimation windows. A very low number of banks exhibit abnormal returns simultaneously (within a one 
week window) showing that unexpected shocks do not generally affect banks as a group (cluster effects). 
We also computed correlations on the basis of distance to defaults (Merton model) which exhibit relatively 
high and mostly stable values because of very low changes in individual default risks during the period 
2000-2005. These results are available from the authors on request. 
5 Considering the residuals of the market model instead of the actual returns allows us to smooth episodes 
of higher volatility and therefore to limit the impact of higher volatility on the computation of correlations : 
the elimination of the market component of returns’ volatility avoids the problem of fallacious high 
correlations induced by increasing standard deviations of the actual returns as pointed by  Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002). Such a measure is expected to be less sensitive to changes in market volatility.  
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correlations between each pair of banks operating in the same country and cross correlations 
between each pair of banks operating in different countries are used to compute both domestic 
average correlations and cross-border6 average correlations7. Correlations are estimated using 
exponential weighted average rolling correlations. The estimated average correlations are tested 
for their significance. We also compute a measure of the statistical contribution of each bank to 
average domestic country correlation or average cross border country correlation by regressing 
each average individual correlation time series on the average corresponding country correlation 
and test for significance. Next, significant contributions are introduced in a binary probit model 
to capture the determinants of systemic risk potential using a large set of accounting based and 
market based variables.  
3.1 Measuring domestic and cross border potential systemic risk 
Formally, let i(P) represent bank i of country P and Ri(P) t the weekly stock return of this bank. 
The market adjusted return ri(P) t is the residual at time t of equation 1: 
(1)      tPiPtiitPi rRMR    
estimated on the rolling one year window [t - 51, t] and where RMPt is the weekly market return 
for country P. Alternatively, we compute market adjusted returns using other specifications (e.g., 
residuals from a constant return model, from a two-index market model including the banking 
sector index, from a two-index GARCH model and standardised residuals from a two-index 
GARCH model). For simplicity, and because our aim is to focus on the determinants of co-
movements of returns rather than on their statistical properties we opted to use the standard 
single-index market model in the rest of our investigation.  Nevertheless, we check that the 
                                                          
6 The cross border systemic risk that is considered here refers to risk arising from co-movements of Asian 
bank equity prices and not due to cross border activities referred to in the review in Section 2 which refer to 
foreign, i.e., non-Asian banks’ activities in the region. 
7 A rank correlation test shows that the rankings of banks on the basis of domestic and cross border 
correlations are independent. This lead us to consider cross border and domestic correlations separately.  
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residuals computed with the different methods have a similar profile except when they are 
standardised in which case they are much lower.  
Denoting t(i,j) as the moving exponentially weighted correlation evaluated at time t between 
rit and rjt,8 the domestic mean correlation within country P, DOMCPt, at time t is calculated as: 
(2)       
 

Pi Pj
t
Pt
Pt
PjPi
N
DOMC ,1   ; i  j 
where NPt is the number of (non redundant) domestic pair-wise correlations, at time t, within 
country P. Because we are concerned with how negative shocks affecting one bank might spread 
to other banks and not with the implications of positive shocks (unexpected increase in stock 
prices) we also compute correlations between simultaneously negative residuals solely.  We 
further look at the correlations of sharp decreases in returns considering several thresholds (-3% 
and –10%).  The series of domestic mean correlations that can be computed with these different 
definitions are highly correlated. We therefore retain the standard definition involving all the 
residuals (positive and negative). Another issue that arises when computing correlations is that 
higher volatility on the market is often associated to higher correlation (Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002)). To check that our measures are not sensitive to changes in market volatility we also 
compute volatility adjusted correlations that account for varying volatility in the series of 
returns9.   Both methods yield very close results and we therefore focus in the rest of the study on 
the standard correlation measure that is adjusted for changes in market volatility.  
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51 51 51
s s 2 s 2
t i P t s j P t s i P t s j P t s
s 0 s 0 s 0
i, j r r r r
   
  
  
   
  
       where  = 0.940 as suggested in Engle 
[2002]. 
9 Volatility adjusted correlation at time t,*ijt, as suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (1999), is calculated as : 
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Similarly, because our aim is to focus on market adjusted return co-movements for banks 
operating in different countries, we also calculate the cross border mean correlations, CBMCPt, 
involving each bank i of country P with any other bank j of other countries P', (P'  P):  
(3)       
  

PP Pi Pj
t
Pt
Pt
PjPi
N
CBMC
' '
',
'
1   
where N'Pt is the number of cross border (non redundant) correlations for country P at time t.  
We then test for the null of no domestic (respectively cross border) correlation for each 
country through the statistic: 
(4)   
Pt
PtPt
Pt DOSC
NDOMC
TDO   
where DOSCPt is the standard deviation of domestic correlations:10 
(5)        
 

Pi Pj
Ptt
Pt
Pt
DOMCPjPi
N
DOSC 2,1   ; i  j 
The individual mean domestic (DOMCi(P) t) and cross border (CBMCi(P) t) correlations for bank 
i(P) are evaluated at time t as: 
(6)  
 
    


Pj
t
tPi
tPi PjPi
N
DOMC ,
1
 ;   
 
     
 

PP Pj
t
tPi
tPi PjPi
N
CBMC
' '
',
'
1
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
*
21 1

 
ijt
ijt
ijt


 
where 
22
2 2
0.5
 
  
 
 
jtit
i j


 
, it2 is the variance of returns rit evaluated on the 
sample [t-52, t] and 
2
i is the whole sample [1994, 2005] variance of rit. 
10 Similarly, we define a statistic TCBPt for the null of no cross border correlation for country P: 
 
Pt
PtPt
Pt
CBSC
NCBMC
TCB
'
  where      
  

PP Pi Pj
Ptt
Pt
Pt CBMCPjPi
N
CBSC
'
2',
'
1
  
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where Ni(P) t (resp. N'i(P) t) stands for the number of domestic (respectively cross border) 
correlations involving bank i(P) at time t. 
3.2 Statistical contribution of individual banks to country systemic risk 
We assess the statistical contribution of a given bank i(P) to its country P domestic systemic 
risk by regressing each individual mean correlation involving bank i(P) on country P average 
domestic correlation:  
(7)     itPtiitPi DOMCDOMC    
Equation (7) is estimated only for sub-periods where the country average correlation DOMCPt 
is positive and significant.11 The statistical contribution of each bank to domestic systemic risk is, 
in this setting, given by the value and significance of the i coefficient. In this sense when, for a 
given bank the value of i is significantly greater than 1, we take this to mean that the bank 
overreacts in terms of co-movements of its stock price with other banks’ stock prices. In such a 
case, a bank’s individual mean correlation is significantly higher than the country mean 
correlation. 
Similarly, we measure the contribution of bank i(P) to cross border correlation of country P 
using the same method but by regressing individual bank cross border correlations CBMCi(P) t on 
country P average cross border correlation CBMCPt:  
(8)     itPttPi CBMCCBMC    ''  
where the actual contribution or sensitivity of each bank is given by the value and significance of 
the 'i coefficient.  
                                                          
11 We required TDOPt and TCBPt to be greater than 2. 
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3.3 Econometric specification  
Our aim is to investigate, within our sample of banks and countries, which types of banks are 
the most likely either to trigger systemic risk or to sharply react to events affecting other banks. 
Under the contagion hypothesis a higher share of interbank activities in the balance sheet is 
assumed to increase the probability that a bank becomes illiquid and in turn spreads illiquidity 
among other banks in the industry. However, under the too-big-to-fail hypothesis this is less 
likely to happen to large banks which would immediately receive support from monetary and 
supervisory authorities. Under the asymmetric information hypothesis market participants are 
unable to discriminate among solvent and insolvent banks and particularly those with a high 
share of non-tradable and opaque loans in total assets. Such banks would therefore be more likely 
to suffer from a widespread panic within the banking industry. In order to investigate these 
hypotheses we build a multivariate regression framework based on the systemic risk potential 
measures and the individual contributions to average residual correlations we previously 
estimated.  
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
In our setting, domestic (respectively cross border) contribution of bank i to systemic risk is 
assumed to play a prominent role if i (respectively, 'i) is greater than 1. In this sense the 
correlations (co-movements) of market adjusted stock returns of a given bank with those of other 
banks are on average higher than the mean correlation. Therefore on the basis of the estimated 
values and standard deviations of these coefficients i and 'i, we define two binary variables 
DP_DOM_2i and DP_CB_2i such that DP_DOM_2i (respectively DP_CB_2i) equals 1 if we can 
reject the null "i  1" (respectively "'i  1") at the 2% level and 0 otherwise. 
Alternatively, we also consider for the dependent variable the values taken by individual 
bank mean correlations, i.e., for each bank either the domestic mean correlation with every other 
domestic bank or the cross border mean correlation with every bank from other countries. Such 
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an approach is much less constraining and allows us to capture the determinants of bank stock 
co-movements without imposing a criterion to discriminate sharp and moderate stock price 
reactions.  
3.3.2 Independent variables 
 To explain the probability of a relatively sharp reaction of bank i(P) with respect to the mean 
(domestic or cross border) correlation of country P, we regress each of the two binary variables 
on a large set of accounting variables, capturing the size and the structure of bank balance sheets 
as well as bank risk and performance. We also consider market based risk indicators that are 
commonly used in the literature (see Table 1). The values taken by each variable are the mean 
values computed over the whole sample period.  
Table 1 here 
3.3.3 Model specification  
As a first step, we consider the explanatory power of each indicator by running probit 
regressions in which we introduce each variable separately. Then, on the basis of the results of 
this first step, within each category (size, capital adequacy, earnings, liquidity, etc.) we isolate the 
most significant variables (5% level). As a second step, we identify, within this restricted set of 
variables, the optimal set of explanatory variables by selecting them through a stepwise 
procedure.12 We check for possible collinearity among the independent variables by running a 
Farrar – Glauber test for the null of no collinearity. When required, to deal with collinearity, we 
introduce an additional constraint of quasi-orthogonality13 in the stepwise process. As a third 
step, we test for the stability of this optimal set of explanatory variables with regard to several 
                                                          
12 P-values for introduction and rejection are 5%. To avoid estimating the model on an excessively small 
sample (because very few observations are available for some variables), we require that the introduction of 
an additional variable does not induce (1) an estimation sample with a size less than half of the potential 
sample size and (2) a loss of "Y = 1" instances exceeding 50%. 
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factors such as bank type, its nationality, its domestic and world rankings. For this purpose, we 
introduce additional dummy variables in the estimations to test for the stability of the equation.14 
These dummy variables are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 here 
4 Data set and Results  
4.1 Data and independent variable definitions  
 For the purpose of our study which comprises 8 East Asian countries (Hong Kong (HK), 
Indonesia (ID), Korea (KO), Malaysia (MY), The Philippines (PH), Singapore (SG), Taiwan (TW) 
and Thailand (TH)), we use weekly stock prices that come from Datastream International and 
annual accounting data (balance sheet and income statement) that are extracted from Bankscope 
for the period 2000-2005.15 The values of the different regressors (prefixed with M6_) are averages 
from the whole sample period 2000 – 2005. To ensure that we use a clean sample, banks that are 
not actively traded (two subsequent identical quotes for, at least, 50% of the whole quotation 
sample) are omitted. To avoid the effects of outliers on the results, we eliminate extreme 
observations in each regressor that induce a variation coefficient (standard deviation/sample 
mean) greater than two. With these restrictions our sample is limited to 125 banks (See column 1 
of Table 4). Descriptive statistics of accounting ratios and market based risk and default risk 
indicators are given in Table 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 This constraint allows us to exclude a variable if its introduction would induce a rejection of the null (no 
collinearity) with a p-value less than 50%.  
14 Assuming that the estimated model is (1) Prob{Yi = 1} = 1 + 2X2i + ... + kXki), we test for stability by 
comparing the likelihood of this equation and the augmented model (2) which is: 
 
Prob{Yi = 1} = 1 + 2X2i + ... + kXki + 1' + 2'Di  X2i + ... + k'Di  Xki) 
 
where Di is the dummy variable for bank characteristics. We compute a LR statistic for the null of stability: 
LR = 2 [Log L2 – Log L1]. Under the null, LR is distributed as a 
(k). 
15 As mentioned in section 1, we focus on the post-crisis period but we also compute our correlation 
measures for the period 1996-1999. The results are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 3 here 
4.2 Potential systemic risk measures  
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for mean domestic and cross border market adjusted 
returns correlations for the whole set of banks and for each country specific set of banks:16 
Table 4 here 
Based on the domestic correlation estimates, we are able to distinguish two sets of countries, a 
relatively low domestic correlation category (Indonesia with an average correlation of 0.03, 
Malaysia, 0.09, Philippines, 0.05, Singapore, 0.08, Hong Kong, 0.13) and a high domestic 
correlation category (Korea with an average correlation of 0.24, Thailand, 0.20 and Taiwan 0.36). 
Such differences in the levels of correlations might be induced by market structure (degree of 
integration and/or concentration in domestic banking industries or by differences in the 
characteristics of the business cycle). Cross border correlations are on average much lower and do 
not exhibit significant differences among countries17. Because banking industries are not yet 
sufficiently integrated in the region these results are not surprising.  
On the basis of estimations performed following equations (7) and (8) we construct two binary 
variables DP_DOM_2i and DB_CB_2i. Recall that DP_DOM_2i (respectively DP_CB_2i) equals 1 if 
bank i(P) overreacts or contributes to an increase in the domestic (respectively cross border) 
country (P) mean correlations during periods for which this country domestic (respectively cross 
border) correlations are significant. Table 5 shows the country distribution of these binary 
dependent variables and their cross distribution. One can note from the cross distribution that 
                                                          
16 These descriptive statistics are calculated on the basis of the two dimensions: through time (2000 – 2005 
period) and through individuals. 
17 We also apply the same method using Merton Distance to Default measures instead of market-adjusted 
returns (results available on request). In this case, mean correlations are generally higher and the values are 
closer for the different countries in our sample except Singapore and the Philippines which exhibit much 
lower average values.  
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banks which highly contribute to domestic correlations are, on the whole, different from banks 
highly contributing to cross border correlations. 
Table 5 here 
4.3 Probit model estimation results 
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results obtained on the basis of simple probit estimations. For 
each variable, we check for the robustness of the results with regard to the estimation sample by 
bootstrapping it one thousand times. Each bootstrapped sample is built on random draws within 
the actual sample. We require that at least 50 observations are available whatever the value of the 
explained variable and that, at least, 10 observations are available for the binary variable Y = 1 at 
each step. At this preliminary stage we can notice that the variables that are most likely to 
increase individual bank i(P) contribution to the average domestic correlation level of country P 
are balance sheet structure variables (M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA, M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA, M6_ 
NL_TEA_CSTF_TA, M6_ NL_TEA), liquidity variables (M6_ NL_CSTF) and variables reflecting the 
extent of non banking activities (M6_ NOIT_AVAS).18 When explaining contribution to cross 
border correlations, the most significant variables are "asset quality" variables (M6_ LLP_GL, M6_ 
LLP_TA, M6_LLR_IL), income structure variables (M6_ NMARG) or market based risk indicators 
(M6_ BETA). These results suggest that in the case of cross-country correlations (cross border 
spillovers) market participants rely only on asset risk and default risk indicators computed on the 
basis of either accounting information (asset quality and capital adequacy) or market information 
(systematic risk). However, for domestic correlations (risk within the domestic banking system) 
such variables have no explanatory power. Market based indicators are never significant and 
only liquidity risk and bank opaqueness variables tend to increase the correlation of a bank’s 
unexplained performance with those of other banks. In particular, asset opaqueness as measured 
                                                          
18 Non operating items = Non Operating Incomes (net profit on value adjusted of financial assets, share in 
net income of equity accounted affiliates…) - Non Operating Expenses (write downs of goodwills...) – 
Income Tax. 
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by the share of non-tradable loans, the reliance on deposits or short term funding and the extent 
to which the bank relies on traditional intermediation activities (transformation of short term 
deposits into loans) as measured by the interactive variables M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA, M6_ 
NL_TEA_DEP_TA, M6_ NL_TEA_CSTF_TA, play a significant role. The optimal multivariate 
probit models presented in Tables 8 (domestic correlations) and 9 (cross border correlations) 
confirm these findings. Because there is a presumption of high collinearity between the stepwise 
selected regressors, we produce two estimates: first, no a priori condition is required with regard 
to collinearity among the selected variables; second, a low level of collinearity is required as 
mentioned above. The regressors that were pre-selected and introduced in our optimal models 
are shown at the bottom of Tables 8 and 9 along with their correlation matrix.  
Tables 8 and 9 here 
In each case, we test further for the null of adequacy between theoretical and estimated 
probabilities by conducting the Hosmer Lemeshow goodness-of-fit-test19 (Tables 8-A and 9-A).  
Tables 8-A and 9–A here 
When we account for collinearity among the regressors, in both cases (domestic and cross 
border equations) the null of adequacy between estimated and theoretical probabilities is not 
rejected at the 5% risk level. The stability tests results20 are shown in Table 8-B (domestic 
correlations equation) and Table 9-B (cross border correlations equation).  
                                                          
19 The Hosmer Lemeshow Test is a test for the null of adequacy between theoretical (unobservable) and 
estimated probabilities of Yi = 1. To implement this test, one has to group the N individuals of the sample in   
J groups on the basis of increasing fitted probabilities and to compare actual and fitted frequencies within 
these groups. Under the null, the HL statistic is distributed as a 2(J-2).  
20 We test for the stability of our last models through a LR test based on the comparison of the respective 
performances of two models: 
 
 Model 1: Yi =  +  Xi + Zi + I 
 Model M2: Yi =  +  Xi + Zi + ' Di + ' Xi * Di + ' Zi * Di + I 
 
where Di is a dummy variable that enables us to account for the possible influence of the size of the bank 
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Tables 8-B and 9-B here 
On the whole one or three variables survive the stepwise process defined above to optimally 
explain significant correlations. Default risk variables accounting for risk exposure, profitability 
and the amount of equity that serves as a cushion against failure have been rejected from the 
optimal models (capital adequacy variables and Z scores). For domestic correlations (Table 8), the 
highest significance level is obtained with the interactive variable capturing the extent of 
traditional intermediation activity M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA. Therefore, a higher proportion of 
deposits on the liability side of the balance sheet combined with a larger share of loans in total 
assets increase bank exposure or contribution to systemic risk (higher probability). For cross 
border correlations (Table 9), when we account for collinearity among regressors, the highest 
significance level is obtained with the market based systematic risk indicator (M6_ BETA) and to a 
lesser extent with the ratios of loan loss reserves to impaired loans (M6_LLR_IL) and loan loss 
provisions to gross loans (M6_LLP_GL). Therefore, for cross border spillover effects that can be 
captured through the linkages between bank stock returns, market participants seem to rely more 
on market risk indicators such as the beta and to a lesser extent on bank asset risk (asset quality) 
as reflected by loan loss reserves or loan loss provisions. For cross border contagion the market 
does not seem to value liquidity risk, asset opaqueness and default risk (probability of failure). 
Our results therefore suggest that because banking industries might not be well integrated in the 
Asia Pacific Region, the major concern of market participants is risk taking and not liquidity. In 
contrast, at the domestic level, co-movements of market-adjusted returns are not driven by asset 
risk considerations but solely by illiquidity and asset opaqueness. Therefore, at the domestic level 
market participants seem to worry first about factors that are specific to the banking industry.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
(domestic or world ranking of assets), support of authorities, specialisation (commercial or investment 
bank), individual rating, country... (see Table 7 for Di definitions). 
 
Under the null (H0: stability of coefficients {, , }), the LR statistic is distributed as a (2k) where k is the 
number of estimated coefficients in model 1. 
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5 Conclusion  
Previous studies on systemic risk in Southeast Asia focus on macroeconomic factors of bank 
contagion neglecting the information contained in bank stock prices. The aim of this paper is to 
propose a view based on a market model approach to assess the determinants of bank contagion 
at both the domestic and the cross border level in Southeast Asia. Our findings show that 
potential systemic risk measured as the correlation of the residuals of the market model 
significantly differs between two groups of countries. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, exhibit lower systemic risk than Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. Our 
results also show that cross border contagion risk is better explained by asset risk indicators 
whereas domestic contagion risk is better explained by illiquidity and the extent of traditional 
intermediation activities (non tradable loans) which are opaque. Our findings suggest that 
whereas illiquidity, but not insolvency, is a major concern at the domestic level the opposite is 
true for cross-country contagion. Our results are consistent with the lack of integration of banking 
industries in the Asia Pacific region.   
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Table 1 
Accounting and market based regressors in Probit Models 
Size TA Total Assets – th USD 
CapitalAdequacy KP_A total equities / total assets 
 KP_LIAB total equities / total liabilities 
 KP_NL total equities / net loans 
 TCR total capital ratio  
 TIER1 tier 1 ratio  
Assets Quality IL_GL impaired loans / gross loans  
 LLP_GL LLP / gross loans 
 LLP_NETIR loans loss provision / net interest revenue  
 LLP_TA LLP / total assets 
 LLR_GL loans loss reserve / gross loans (GL = net loans + LLR) 
 LLR_IL loan loss res / impaired loans  
 LLR_TA LLR / total assets 
 NCO_AGL net charge off / average gross loans  
 NCO_NIBLLR net charge off / net inc bef LLP 
 RWA_TA risk weighted assets / total assets 
Earnings DIVPO Dividend Pay-Out  
 NIR_EA net interest revenue / total earning assets 
 NIR_TA net interest revenue / total assets 
 ROAA return on average total assets 
 ROAE return on average total equities 
 TXOPI_AVAS Pre-Tax Op Inc / Avg Assets  
Liquidity GL_DSTF gross loans /deposits & short term funding  
 NL_CSTF net loans / customer & ST funding  
 LIQASS_DSTF liquid assets / deposits & short term funding 
 LIQASS_TOTDB liquid assets / (total deposits + total borrowed funds) 
Interbank Activity BKSDEP_ASS_TA banks deposits (assets)/ total assets 
 INTBKDEP_TA (banks deposits (liab.) + banks deposits (ass.) / total assets 
 INTBKDUE_TA (due to banks + due from banks) / total assets 
 INTERBK due from banks / due to banks 
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Table 1, Continued 
Accounting and market based regressors in Probit Models 
Balance Sheet Structure CAPF_DEPST cap funds / dep & ST funding  
 CAPF_LIAB capital funds / liabilities  
 CAPF_NL cap funds / net loans  
 CAPF_TA cap funds / tot assets 
 CSTF_TA customer & ST funding / total assets 
 DEP_TA total deposits / total assets 
 EQ_DEPST equity / dep & ST funding  
 NL_TA net loans / total assets 
 NL_TDBor net loans / tot dep.& bor. 
 NL_TEA net loans / total earning assets 
 SUBD_LIAB subd. debt / total liabilities 
 SUBD_TA subordinated debt / total assets 
 TBF_CAP total borrowed funds / total capital 
 TOEA_TEA total other earning assets / total earning assets 
 NL_TA_DEP_TA NL_TA * DEP_TA 
 NL_TEA_DEP_TA NL_TEA * DEP_TA 
 NL_TA_CSTF_TA NL_TA * CSTF_TA 
 NL_TEA_CSTF_TA NL_TEA * CSTF_TA 
Income Statement Structure COM_OPINC (commission income - commission expenses) / operating income 
 COST_INC cost to income ratio  
 FEE_OPINC (fee income - fee expenses) / operating income 
 NETINC_AVEQ inc net of dist / avg equity  
 NIE_AVAS non int exp / avg assets  
 NIIR_AVAS net int rev / avg assets  
 NIR_NINC net interest revenue / net income 
 NMARG net interest margin  
 NOI_NETINC non op items / net income  
 NOIT_AVAS non op items & taxes / avg assets 
 OOI_AVAS oth op inc / avg assets  
 OVHD_OPINC overhead / operating income 
 PERS_OPINC personnal expenses / operating income  
 RER recurring earning power  
 TRAD_OPINC (trading income - trading expenses) / operating income 
Mkt Risk Ind. BETA  beta annual mean 
 RISK_SPEC annual mean of specific risk 
 RISK_TOT annual mean of total risk 
 Z z score annual mean 
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Table 2 
Stability Test of the optimal equation: definition of dummy variables 
Dummy Equals one if (zero elsewhere):  
D_COM Commercial bank 
D_INV Investment bank 
D_HK Nationality = Hong Kong 
D_ID Nationality = Indonesia 
D_MY Nationality = Malaysia 
D_SG Nationality = Singapore 
D_PH Nationality = Philippines 
D_TA Nationality = Taïwan 
D_TH Nationality = Thailand 
D_KO Nationality = Korea 
D_CRK10 Country Rank  10 
D_WRLDRK500 World Rank  500 
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Table 3 
Statistical properties of the regressors 
Observations that induced a standard deviation / sample mean ratio greater than two were ruled out 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
M6_ TA21 10906739 3980695 146000000 26386 20521751 123 
M6_ KP_A 19.066 9.776 94.282 0.114 20.255 123 
M6_ KP_LIAB 20.751 10.845 112.975 5.513 23.108 99 
M6_ KP_NL 51.543 21.538 423.753 7.777 77.127 97 
M6_ TCR 15.538 15.129 29.845 9.732 4.661 68 
M6_ TIER1 19.654 10.982 146.4 5.6 28.439 59 
M6_ IL_GL 9.019 6.152 45.962 -2.286 8.402 87 
M6_ LLP_GL 1.411 1.217 13.699 -2.522 1.846 95 
M6_ LLP_NETIR 24.122 19.665 76.037 -4.441 21.066 84 
M6_ LLP_TA 0.745 0.546 4.887 -0.841 0.86 106 
M6_ LLR_GL 8.624 5.586 67.321 0.704 10.254 100 
M6_ LLR_IL 70.334 69.512 339.004 -475 87.907 86 
M6_ LLR_TA 3.902 2.494 30.203 0.221 4.806 100 
M6_ NCO_AGL 3.197 1.475 31.296 -0.472 5.568 63 
M6_ NCO_NIBLLR 59.025 51.682 212.062 5.033 50.572 41 
M6_ RWA_TA 66.148 67.022 93.596 39.838 12.965 39 
M6_ DIVPO 49.6 38.887 243.732 -3.262 40.65 64 
M6_ NIR_EA 2.716 2.581 5.325 1.33 1.027 95 
M6_ NIR_TA 2.576 2.206 31.281 -17.458 4.425 119 
M6_ ROAA 0.965 0.966 3.074 -0.863 0.868 98 
M6_ ROAE 7.282 6.764 19.517 -13.076 6.404 98 
M6_ TXOPI_AVAS 1.036 0.984 3.013 -0.866 0.977 74 
M6_ GL_DSTF 72.749 73.002 130.347 39.058 17.942 77 
M6_ NL_CSTF22 59.315 63.426 96.096 -1.385 23.056 100 
M6_ LIQASS_DSTF 45.994 31.7 182.933 12.331 36.881 94 
M6_ LIQASS_TOTDB 41.067 27.875 250.005 1.01 38.087 102 
M6_ BKSDEP_ASS_TA 10.59 6.795 50.904 0.176 10.983 88 
M6_ INTBKDEP_TA 13.961 9.384 66.885 2.463 12.523 71 
M6_ INTBKDUE_TA 21.76 17.137 70.831 4.535 13.554 54 
M6_ INTERBK 764.846 381.862 4099.456 119.634 918.808 36 
M6_ CAPF_DEPST 20.019 12.64 111.278 6.553 19.735 77 
M6_ CAPF_LIAB 39.202 11.487 429.675 1.809 75.742 99 
M6_ CAPF_NL 30.06 20.604 193.189 8.475 29.51 76 
M6_ CAPF_TA 19.21 10.355 94.283 0.114 20.3 100 
M6_ CSTF_TA 75.433 81.843 92.229 5.206 18.19 93 
M6_ DEP_TA 66.942 77.473 92.186 0.577 25.356 116 
M6_ EQ_DEPST 24.997 11.856 228.18 5.904 35.443 92 
M6_ NL_TA 46.364 48.284 94.147 -0.458 22.23 121 
                                                          
21 Thousand of US$. 
22 For this variable, we have also ruled out 15 observations greater than 100%. 
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M6_ NL_TDBOR 74.94 62.385 752.257 -1.04 88.068 110 
M6_ NL_TEA 54.53 55.912 100 -1.318 24.118 121 
M6_ SUBD_LIAB 3.677 2.488 26.041 0.028 4.785 67 
M6_ SUBD_TA 2.952 2.073 14.737 0.026 2.971 67 
M6_ TBF_CAP 60.836 43.481 243.21 0.016 64.047 37 
M6_ TOEA_TEA 46.605 45.253 101.318 0.2 24.52 122 
M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA 3535.611 3743.405 6819.55 6.257 2042.047 114 
M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA 4046.926 4270.138 8229.203 18.607 2215.36 114 
M6_ NL_TA_CSTF_TA 3899.952 4116.232 6820.052 -15.116 2006.485 93 
M6_ NL_TEA_CSTF_TA 4433.504 4504.436 8220.851 -43.524 2147.106 93 
M6_ COM_OPINC 34.352 33.106 48.676 16.877 11.416 8 
M6_ COST_INC 70.639 60.131 419.444 24.965 46.054 117 
M6_ FEE_OPINC 75.671 57.841 307.005 -75.927 82.376 48 
M6_ NETINC_AVEQ 6.47 5.092 18.715 -3.064 5.382 59 
M6_ NIE_AVAS 5.783 3.611 31.297 0.704 6.398 120 
M6_ NIIR_AVAS 2.739 2.296 32.496 -14.416 4.587 119 
M6_ NIR_NINC 266.806 191.474 960.165 -2.545 216.566 95 
M6_ NMARG 2.805 2.687 5.211 0.938 1.052 95 
M6_ NOI_NETINC 10.594 6.097 45.783 -17.236 15.448 73 
M6_ NOIT_AVAS -0.188 -0.163 0.245 -0.973 0.26 77 
M6_ OOI_AVAS 4.52 1.406 35.299 -3.594 7.794 120 
M6_ OVHD_OPINC 202.433 155.63 620.328 -55.5 148.892 96 
M6_ PERS_OPINC 92.57 69.097 238.904 6.672 59.864 84 
M6_ RER 2.016 1.567 15.915 -18.447 3.735 122 
M6_ TRAD_OPINC 9.718 6.423 44.602 -6.569 12.465 25 
M6_ BETA 0.971 0.957 2.038 0.11 0.374 124 
M6_ RISK_SPEC 0.055 0.051 0.167 0.018 0.024 124 
M6_ RISK_TOT 0.067 0.065 0.177 0.02 0.025 124 
M6_ Z 19.229 17.659 49.319 6.048 7.991 124 
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Table 4 
Descriptive per country statistics for returns correlations 
Mean Individual Domestic Correlations; [2000 - 2005] Descriptive Statistics 
Set of banks Number of banks Mean StDev Min Max Median 
Full Set 125 0.184 0.167 -0.354 0.717 0.167 
Hong Kong 12 0.132 0.121 -0.232 0.520 0.123 
Indonesia 16 0.030 0.067 -0.191 0.254 0.029 
Korea 20 0.242 0.156 -0.147 0.717 0.228 
Malaysia 9 0.091 0.116 -0.354 0.372 0.087 
Philippines 13 0.055 0.089 -0.176 0.353 0.045 
Singapore 4 0.079 0.127 -0.240 0.373 0.086 
Taiwan 22 0.361 0.142 -0.186 0.687 0.376 
Thailand 29 0.203 0.126 -0.289 0.516 0.208 
       
Mean Individual Cross Border Correlations; [2000 - 2005] Descriptive Statistics 
Set of banks Number of banks Mean StDev Min Max Median 
Full Set 125 0.005 0.037 -0.155 0.163 0.005 
Hong Kong 12 0.002 0.041 -0.136 0.132 0.003 
Indonesia 16 0.000 0.040 -0.155 0.117 0.000 
Korea 20 0.009 0.037 -0.116 0.163 0.008 
Malaysia 9 0.012 0.040 -0.104 0.135 0.013 
Philippines 13 0.006 0.035 -0.121 0.141 0.005 
Singapore 4 0.014 0.035 -0.066 0.130 0.015 
Taiwan 22 0.003 0.032 -0.118 0.121 0.003 
Thailand 29 0.001 0.038 -0.135 0.130 0.002 
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Table 5 
Distribution of the binary variables DP_DOM_2_and et DP_CB_2 (returns based correlations) 
Set of Banks 
Number of 
Banks 
DP_DOM 
Tot. disposable 
Obs. 
Obs. Nb.  
such that 
DP_DOM  = 1 
DP_CB 
Tot. disposable 
Obs. 
Obs. Nb.  
such that 
DP_CB = 1 
Full Set 125 117 40 113 36 
Hong Kong 12 12 5 12 3 
Indonesia 16 14 2 13 5 
Korea 20 20 7 20 5 
Malaysia 9 9 3 9 3 
Philippines 13 11 4 11 1 
Singapore 4 4 1 4 0 
Taïwan 22 21 7 20 7 
Thailand 29 26 11 24 12 
      
 
Cross distribution   DP_CB_2  
Count  0 1 Total 
 0 50 23 73 
DP_DOM_2 1 27 13 40 
 Total 77 36 113 
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Table 6  
Simple Model*: DP_DOM_2 (returns based correlations) 
Variable Smpl.Est.Coef. 
Smpl.Est.Z 
stat 
H0 
Reject. 
Mean Bootst. Est. 
Coef. 
Bootst. Coef. 
Stdev 
Bootst. 
Z 
H0 
Reject. 
N N = 1 
M6_ TA  2.55E-09  0.448   0.000  0.000  0.319   115  38 
M6_ KP_A -0.00768 -1.165  -0.009  0.008 -0.928   115  38 
M6_ KP_LIAB -0.00622 -1.137  -0.007  0.007 -0.949   93  26 
M6_ KP_NL -0.00341 -1.562  -0.005  0.004 -0.861   90  28 
M6_ TCR -0.016 -0.440  -0.021  0.043 -0.373   63  26 
M6_ TIER1 -0.0244 -2.008 ** -0.033  0.023 -1.045   55  21 
M6_ IL_GL  0.00797  0.487   0.008  0.019  0.430   80  30 
M6_ LLP_GL -0.0706 -1.092  -0.063  0.088 -0.807   88  31 
M6_ LLP_NETIR  0.00803  1.167   0.009  0.007  1.086   78  27 
M6_ LLP_TA  0.0282  0.201   0.050  0.170  0.166   99  36 
M6_ LLR_GL -0.00465 -0.340  -0.006  0.019 -0.242   92  33 
M6_ LLR_IL  0.00136  0.905   0.001  0.003  0.475   80  30 
M6_ LLR_TA  0.0291  1.015   0.026  0.040  0.732   92  33 
M6_ NCO_AGL  0.00047  0.017   0.008  0.055  0.009   59  22 
M6_ NCO_NIBLLR 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ RWA_TA 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ DIVPO  5.84E-07  0.000   0.001  0.005  0.000   59  18 
M6_ NIR_EA -0.0481 -0.357  -0.058  0.139 -0.345   91  34 
M6_ NIR_TA  0.0425  1.693 *  0.030  0.054  0.789   111  38 
M6_ ROAA -0.252 -1.586  -0.259  0.166 -1.517   92  35 
M6_ ROAE -0.0118 -0.555  -0.013  0.023 -0.512   93  35 
M6_ TXOPI_AVAS -0.37 -2.160 ** -0.394  0.189 -1.952 *  70  26 
M6_ GL_DSTF -0.00239 -0.276  -0.002  0.010 -0.245   71  28 
M6_ NL_CSTF  0.0126  2.159 **  0.013  0.006  2.054 **  93  33 
M6_ LIQASS_DSTF -0.00781 -1.831 * -0.009  0.005 -1.471   87  30 
M6_ LIQASS_TOTDB -0.00729 -1.669 * -0.008  0.005 -1.360   95  32 
M6_ BKSDEP_ASS_TA -0.0184 -1.280  -0.021  0.018 -1.034   82  27 
M6_ INTBKDEP_TA -0.0155 -0.961  -0.023  0.023 -0.661   65  23 
M6_ INTBKDUE_TA -0.0205 -1.253  -0.026  0.023 -0.905   51  19 
M6_ INTERBK 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ CAPF_DEPST -0.0052 -0.705  -0.006  0.011 -0.474   73  26 
M6_ CAPF_LIAB -0.00461 -2.165 ** -0.006  0.003 -1.344   94  32 
M6_ CAPF_NL -0.00951 -1.631  -0.011  0.010 -0.998   72  25 
M6_ CAPF_TA -0.0106 -1.511  -0.012  0.008 -1.280   95  32 
M6_ CSTF_TA  0.0118  1.449   0.013  0.010  1.228   93  33 
M6_ DEP_TA  0.0094  1.703 *  0.010  0.006  1.477   108  36 
M6_ EQ_DEPST  0.000302  0.079  -0.000  0.006  0.053   86  27 
M6_ NL_TA  0.0109  1.949 *  0.011  0.006  1.830 *  113  36 
M6_ NL_TDBor -0.00178 -1.603  -0.002  0.002 -1.051   103  32 
M6_ NL_TEA  0.0111  2.189 **  0.012  0.005  2.067 **  113  36 
M6_ SUBD_LIAB -0.0283 -0.844  -0.037  0.050 -0.570   63  26 
M6_ SUBD_TA -0.0274 -0.496  -0.036  0.070 -0.389   63  26 
M6_ TBF_CAP 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ TOEA_TEA -0.00737 -1.445  -0.008  0.005 -1.471   114  38 
M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA  0.00017  2.687 ***  0.000  0.000  2.511 **  106  34 
M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA  0.000165  2.912 ***  0.000  0.000  2.680 ***  106  34 
M6_ NL_TA_CSTF_TA  0.000129  1.924 *  0.000  0.000  1.854 *  93  33 
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Table 6  
Simple Model*: DP_DOM_2 (returns based correlations) 
Variable Smpl.Est.Coef. 
Smpl.Est.Z 
stat 
H0 
Reject. 
Mean Bootst. Est. 
Coef. 
Bootst. Coef. 
Stdev 
Bootst. 
Z 
H0 
Reject. 
N N = 1 
M6_ 
NL_TEA_CSTF_TA 
 0.00013  2.140 **  0.000  0.000  2.025 **  93  33 
M6_ COM_OPINC 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ COST_INC -0.0014 -0.590  -0.001  0.004 -0.390   110  38 
M6_ FEE_OPINC 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ NETINC_AVEQ  0.0119  0.360   0.011  0.037  0.325   55  16 
M6_ NIE_AVAS -0.0161 -0.710  -0.024  0.036 -0.442   112  38 
M6_ NIIR_AVAS  0.0398  1.565   0.027  0.051  0.782   111  38 
M6_ NIR_NINC  0.000887  1.420   0.001  0.001  1.287   89  29 
M6_ NMARG -0.126 -0.961  -0.132  0.136 -0.929   91  33 
M6_ NOI_NETINC  0.0127  1.266   0.013  0.011  1.129   68  20 
M6_ NOIT_AVAS  1.69  2.484 **  1.831  0.768  2.205 **  73  25 
M6_ OOI_AVAS -0.0258 -1.367  -0.033  0.028 -0.913   112  38 
M6_ OVHD_OPINC  0.000559  0.625   0.000  0.001  0.596   89  29 
M6_ PERS_OPINC  0.000419  0.171   0.000  0.003  0.149   79  26 
M6_ RER -0.0181 -0.622  -0.025  0.037 -0.491   114  38 
M6_ TRAD_OPINC 
Insuf. Obs. 
Nb. 
        
M6_ BETA  0.532  1.609   0.530  0.347  1.536   117  40 
M6_ RISK_SPEC -4.78 -1.009  -4.923  5.094 -0.939   117  40 
M6_ RISK_TOT -2.48 -0.542  -2.528  4.976 -0.497   117  40 
M6_ Z  0.00695  0.445   0.006  0.017  0.420   117  40 
*Model: Prob{DP_DOM_2i = 1} = ( +  Xi)  
(.) is the cumulated frequency function of the Normal distribution 
DP_DOM_2i = 1 if coefficient i in equation /7/ is significantly greater than 1 (risk level for the test = 2%)  
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Newton-Raphson) - QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
We required at least 50 observations and 10 observations such that the explained variable equals one. 
Bootstrapped coefficients and standard deviation are based on 1000 bootstrapping replications. 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 7: Simple Model: DP_CB_2 (returns based correlations) 
Variable Smpl.Est.Coef. 
Smpl.Est. 
H0 Reject 
Mean Bootst. 
Est. Coef. 
Bootst. Coef. 
Stdev Bootst. Z H0 Reject. N N = 1 Z stat 
M6_ TA -4.13E-09 -0.693   0  0.000 -0.427    111  35 
M6_ KP_A  0.00107  0.181   0.001  0.007  0.161   111  35 
M6_ KP_LIAB  0.00123  0.192   0.001  0.008  0.148   89  28 
M6_ KP_NL  0.00366  1.950 *  0.004  0.002  1.485   86  30 
M6_ TCR -0.0108 -0.35  -0.009  0.034 -0.316   63  17 
M6_ TIER1  0.011  1.696 *  0.021  0.026  0.418    54  20 
M6_ IL_GL  0.00785  0.470   0.008  0.019  0.406   80  28 
M6_ LLP_GL -0.413 -2.522 ** -0.457  0.186 -2.228 **  87  29 
M6_ LLP_NETIR -0.00135 -0.184  -0.001  0.008 -0.175   75  27 
M6_ LLP_TA -0.633 -2.677 *** -0.684  0.246 -2.572 **  96  31 
M6_ LLR_GL  0.0131  0.899   0.018  0.019  0.698   91  29 
M6_ LLR_IL  0.00632  2.419 **  0.007  0.003  2.101 **  80  28 
M6_ LLR_TA  0.0614  1.855 *  0.071  0.047  1.298   91  29 
M6_ NCO_AGL  0.0297  0.958   0.040  0.053  0.564   59  18 
M6_ NCO_NIBLLR Insuf. Obs. Nb.         
M6_ RWA_TA Insuf. Obs. Nb.                 
M6_ DIVPO -0.00749 -1.448  -0.009  0.006 -1.158   59  13 
M6_ NIR_EA -0.246 -1.641  -0.263  0.165 -1.488   89  30 
M6_ NIR_TA -0.0281 -0.854  -0.058  0.080 -0.35   108  35 
M6_ ROAA  0.0449  0.267   0.047  0.182  0.247   89  30 
M6_ ROAE  0.00704  0.320   0.009  0.024  0.294   90  31 
M6_ TXOPI_AVAS  0.0747  0.461    0.081  0.174  0.429    68  24 
M6_ GL_DSTF  0.00426  0.443   0.004  0.010  0.412   71  22 
M6_ NL_CSTF  0.00467  0.768   0.005  0.007  0.711   91  27 
M6_ LIQASS_DSTF -0.00163 -0.415  -0.002  0.004 -0.368   85  27 
M6_ LIQASS_TOTDB  0.00157  0.467    0.001  0.004  0.372    93  30 
M6_ BKSDEP_ASS_TA -0.00996 -0.748  -0.011  0.014 -0.688   82  25 
M6_ INTBKDEP_TA  0.00566  0.459   0.005  0.015  0.376   65  22 
M6_ INTBKDUE_TA  0.00101  0.070  -0.002  0.018  0.055   51  14 
M6_ INTERBK Insuf. Obs. Nb.                 
M6_ CAPF_DEPST  0.00366  0.493   0.004  0.010  0.372   72  25 
M6_ CAPF_LIAB  0.000441  0.257   0.000  0.002  0.182   93  29 
M6_ CAPF_NL  0.00383  0.734   0.005  0.008  0.509   71  25 
M6_ CAPF_TA -0.000651 -0.102  -0.001  0.007 -0.091   94  29 
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Table 7: Simple Model*: DP_CB_2 (returns based correlations) 
Variable Smpl.Est.Coef. Smpl.Est. H0 Reject 
Mean Bootst. 
Est. Coef. 
Bootst. Coef. 
Stdev Bootst. Z H0 Reject. N N = 1 
M6_ CSTF_TA  0.00559  0.784   0.006  0.008  0.688   91  27 
M6_ DEP_TA -0.000197 -0.038  0  0.006 -0.034   104  32 
M6_ EQ_DEPST -0.00277 -0.732  -0.003  0.006 -0.432   83  24 
M6_ NL_TA  0.00239  0.437   0.002  0.006  0.410   109  35 
M6_ NL_TDBor  0.000241  0.181   0.001  0.003  0.087   100  33 
M6_ NL_TEA  0.00264  0.525   0.003  0.005  0.524   109  35 
M6_ SUBD_LIAB  0.0105  0.326   0.009  0.055  0.191   63  24 
M6_ SUBD_TA -0.00162 -0.031   0.003  0.067 -0.024   63  24 
M6_ TBF_CAP Insuf. Obs. Nb.         
M6_ TOEA_TEA -0.0027 -0.56  -0.003  0.005 -0.524   110  34 
M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA -1.19E-05 -0.187  0  0.000 -0.177   102  32 
M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA -5.65E-06 -0.095  0  0.000 -0.089   102  32 
M6_ NL_TA_CSTF_TA  3.94E-05  0.568   0.000  0.000  0.518   91  27 
M6_ NL_TEA_CSTF_TA  4.47E-05  0.691    0.000  0.000  0.668    91  27 
M6_ COM_OPINC Insuf. Obs. Nb.         
M6_ COST_INC -0.00153 -0.637  -0.001  0.004 -0.403   107  34 
M6_ FEE_OPINC Insuf. Obs. Nb.         
M6_ NETINC_AVEQ  0.0244  0.664   0.025  0.039  0.625   55  9 
M6_ NIE_AVAS -0.0103 -0.481  -0.014  0.027 -0.378   108  35 
M6_ NIIR_AVAS -0.0336 -0.966  -0.052  0.073 -0.459   108  35 
M6_ NIR_NINC -0.00128 -1.954 * -0.001  0.001 -1.738 *  86  29 
M6_ NMARG -0.342 -2.361 ** -0.354  0.154 -2.218 **  89  29 
M6_ NOI_NETINC  0.0083  0.794   0.008  0.012  0.715   66  24 
M6_ NOIT_AVAS  0.0154  0.025   0.023  0.692  0.022   71  24 
M6_ OOI_AVAS  0.0129  0.843   0.013  0.017  0.751   108  35 
M6_ OVHD_OPINC -0.000501 -0.573  0  0.001 -0.552   86  29 
M6_ PERS_OPINC -0.00144 -0.637  -0.001  0.002 -0.593   76  26 
M6_ RER  0.0659  1.832 *  0.070  0.044  1.500   110  35 
M6_ TRAD_OPINC Insuf. Obs. Nb.                 
M6_ BETA  0.715  2.038 **  0.736  0.359  1.995 **  113  36 
M6_ RISK_SPEC  4.32  0.863   5.255  5.726  0.754   113  36 
M6_ RISK_TOT  5.89  1.207    6.326  5.253  1.122    113  36 
M6_ Z -0.0224 -1.219   -0.026  0.020 -1.095    113  36 
*Model: Prob{DP_CB_2i = 1} = ( +  Xi); (.) is the cumulated frequency function of the Normal distribution 
DP_CB_2i = 1 if coefficient 'i in equation /8/ is significantly greater than 1 (risk level for the test = 2%)  
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Newton-Raphson) - QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
We required at least 50 observations and 10 observations such that the explained variable equals one. 
Bootstrapped coefficients and standard deviation are based on 1000 bootstrapping replications. 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 8  
Optimal Multivariate Model for Domestic Contributions (returns based correlations) 
Dependent Variable: DP_DOM_2   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA 0.000165** 5.65E-05 2.911642 0.0036 
C -1.173837*** 0.269240 -4.359815 0.0000 
LR statistic (1 df) 7.191470 McFadden R-squared 0.054064 
Probability(LR stat) 0.007325    
Obs with Dep=0 72 Total obs 106 
Obs with Dep=1 34    
Model: DP_DOM_2i =  X1i +...+ k Xki) 
(.) is the cumulated frequency function of the Normal distribution 
DP_DOM_2i = 1 if coefficient i in equation /7/ is significantly greater than 1 (risk level for the test= 2%)  
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Newton-Raphson) - QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
We required at least 50 observations and 10 observations such that the explained variable equals one. 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
9 regressors were pre-selected : M6_ TXOPI_AVAS, M6_ NL_CSTF, M6_ NL_TA, M6_ NL_TEA, M6_ NOIT_AVAS, M6_ 
NL_TA_CSTF_TA, M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA, M6_ NL_TEA_CSTF_TA, M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA. Because the selection process 
yields only one regressor, collinearity is not a concern. 
 
Correlation matrix of pre-selected regressors 
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M6_ TXOPI_AVAS  1.00 -0.44 -0.49 -0.52 -0.62 -0.53 -0.56 -0.56 -0.58 
M6_ NL_CSTF -0.44  1.00  0.94  0.86  0.44  0.91  0.86  0.90  0.84 
M6_ NL_TA -0.49  0.94  1.00  0.90  0.44  0.99  0.92  0.97  0.89 
M6_ NL_TEA -0.52  0.86  0.90  1.00  0.49  0.88  0.82  0.93  0.86 
M6_ NOIT_AVAS -0.62  0.44  0.44  0.49  1.00  0.43  0.46  0.47  0.49 
M6_ NL_TA_CSTF_TA -0.53  0.91  0.99  0.88  0.43  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.97 
M6_ NL_TA_DEP_TA -0.56  0.86  0.92  0.82  0.46  1.00  1.00  0.98  0.98 
M6_ NL_TEA_CSTF_TA -0.56  0.90  0.97  0.93  0.47  0.98  0.98  1.00  1.00 
M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA -0.58  0.84  0.89  0.86  0.49  0.97  0.98  1.00  1.00 
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Table 9 
Optimal Multivariate Model for Cross Border Contributions (returns based correlations) 
No a priori collinearity restriction 
Dependent Variable: DP_CB_2   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
M6__LLR_IL 0.009257** 0.004301 2.152453 0.0314 
M6__BETA 1.261574** 0.534145 2.361857 0.0182 
M6__NMARG -0.373183** 0.166449 -2.242030 0.0250 
C -1.253237 0.809196 -1.548743 0.1214 
LR statistic (3 df) 13.78436 McFadden R-squared 0.144988 
Probability(LR stat) 0.003214 Total obs 73 
Obs with Dep=0 47 Farrar Glauber Stat 6.34  
Obs with Dep=1 26 Farrar PVal for rejection 38.54% 
A priori collinearity restriction23 
Dependent Variable: DP_CB_2   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
M6_LLR_IL 0.007309** 0.003228 2.264309 0.0236 
M6_BETA 1.670992*** 0.476487 3.506899 0.0005 
M6_LLP_GL -0.382435** 0.185744 -2.058938 0.0395 
C -2.129443*** 0.601612 -3.539563 0.0004 
LR statistic (3 df) 21.93437   McFadden R-squared 0.237225 
Probability(LR stat) 6.73E-05    Total obs 73 
Obs with Dep=0 49 Farrar Glauber Stat 2.36 
Obs with Dep=1 24 Farrar PVal for rejection 88.35% 
Model: DP_CB_2i =  X1i +...+ k Xki) 
(.) is the cumulated frequency function of the Normal distribution 
DP_CB_2i = 1 if coefficient 'i in equation /8/ is significantly greater than 1 (risk level for the test = 2%)  
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Newton-Raphson) - QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
We required at least 50 observations and 10 observations such that the explained variable equals one. 
***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
6 regressors were pre-selected: M6__LLP_GL, M6__LLP_TA, M6__LLR_IL, M6__NIR_NINC, M6__NMARG, M6__BETA.  
 
Correlation matrix of pre-selected variables 
 M6_LLP_GL M6_LLP_TA M6_LLR_IL M6_NIR_NINC M6_NMARG M6_BETA 
M6_LLP_GL  1.00  0.61  0.06  0.21  0.11  0.10 
M6_LLP_TA  0.61  1.00 -0.05  0.13 -0.03  0.04 
M6_LLR_IL  0.06 -0.05  1.00 -0.03  0.11 -0.09 
M6_NIR_NINC  0.21  0.13 -0.03  1.00  0.30 -0.22 
M6_NMARG  0.11 -0.03  0.11  0.30  1.00 -0.15 
M6_BETA  0.10  0.04 -0.09 -0.22 -0.15  1.00 
 
 
                                                          
23 To that purpose we render the introduction of a variable impossible if its introduction would induce a 
rejection of the null (no collinearity) with a p-value less than 50%. 
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Table 8 A 
Goodness of Fit Test (Hosmer Lemeshow) for the Table 8 equation. 
 Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
1 0.1208 0.1896 20 18.0769 1 2.92311 21 1.46980 
2 0.2010 0.2923 14 15.6373 7 5.36270 21 0.67132 
3 0.2958 0.3538 11 14.2387 10 6.76129 21 2.28804 
4 0.3594 0.4162 15 12.9446 6 8.05538 21 0.85080 
5 0.4190 0.5718 12 11.2346 10 10.7654 22 0.10657 
  Total 72 72.1321 34 33.8679 106 5.38653 
H-L Statistic: 5.3865   Prob. Chi-Sq(3) 0.1456 
The null of adequacy between theoretical and estimated probabilities cannot be rejected for a risk level less than 14.5%. 
Table 9 A  
Goodness of Fit Test (Hosmer Lemeshow) for the Table 9 equation. 
No a priori collinearity restriction 
 Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
1 3.E-08 0.1903 11 12.7574 3 1.24262 14 2.72747 
2 0.1998 0.2795 12 11.3086 3 3.69135 15 0.17175 
3 0.2891 0.4053 12 9.24862 2 4.75138 14 2.41175 
4 0.4075 0.5013 5 8.18649 10 6.81351 15 2.73053 
5 0.5054 0.9135 7 5.37202 8 9.62798 15 0.76863 
  Total 47 46.8732 26 26.1268 73 8.81012 
H-L Statistic: 8.8101   Prob. Chi-Sq(3) 0.0319 
The null of adequacy between theoretical and estimated probabilities cannot be rejected for a risk level less than 3.2%. 
A priori collinearity restriction 
 Quantile of Risk Dep=0 Dep=1 Total H-L 
 Low High Actual Expect Actual Expect Obs Value 
1 0.0002 0.1054 13 13.1702 1 0.82975 14 0.03713 
2 0.1154 0.2156 11 12.5634 4 2.43656 15 1.19775 
3 0.2228 0.3065 12 10.3064 2 3.69356 14 1.05481 
4 0.3179 0.4999 10 8.74135 5 6.25865 15 0.43435 
5 0.5005 0.9597 3 4.11073 12 10.8893 15 0.41342 
  Total 49 48.8922 24 24.1078 73 3.13746 
H-L Statistic: 3.1375   Prob. Chi-Sq(3) 0.3709 
The null of adequacy between theoretical and estimated probabilities cannot be rejected for a risk level less than 37.1%. 
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Table 8-B 
Stability test for optimal stepwise selected equation of DP_DOM_2 
Prob{DP_DOM_2 = 1} =   +  M6_ NL_TEA_DEP_TA) 
Dummy LR Stat N.Obs 
N.Obs such 
that Y =1 
PVal for rej. 
d_crk10 2.71 98 31 25.85 
d_wrldrk500 1.73 95 30 42.11 
d_com 1.35 104 33 51.03 
d_inv 5.02 104 33 8.14 
dum_id 1.14 106 34 56.47 
dum_hk 0.69 106 34 70.78 
dum_ko 0.82 106 34 66.33 
dum_my 0.27 106 34 87.34 
dum_ph 0.55 106 34 75.78 
dum_sg 5.50 106 34 6.40 
dum_ta 2.50 106 34 28.60 
dum_th 0.92 106 34 63.04 
The null of stability cannot be rejected for a 5% risk level 
We compare the likelihoods of the stepwise selected equation and the augmented model: 
Stepwise Selected Model 1: Prob{DP_DOM_2i = 1} = Xi ) 
Augmented model 2: Prob{DP_DOM_2i = 1} = Xi XiDi') where Di is a dummy variable defined 
hereafter (X = M6_NL_TEA_DEP_TA) 
We compute a LR statistic for the null of stability: LR = 2 [Log L2 – Log L1]. Under the null, LR is 
distributed as a (2). 
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Table 9-B 
Stability test for optimal stepwise selected equation of DP_CB_2 
Prob{DP_VB_2 = 1} =   +  M6_LLR_IL+  M6_BETA +  M6_LLP_GL) 
Dummy LR Stat N.Obs 
N.Obs such 
that Y =1 
PVal for rej. 
d_crk10 1.02 69 26 90.61 
d_wrldrk500 7.08 66 25 13.18 
d_com 1.89 72 28 75.58 
d_inv 1.24 72 28 87.22 
dum_id 10.93 73 28 2.73 ** 
dum_hk 2.29 73 28 68.26 
dum_ko - - - - 
dum_my - - - - 
dum_ph 1.92 73 28 75.09 
dum_sg - - - - 
dum_ta 5.98 73 28 20.04 
dum_th 3.52 73 28 47.43 
** indicate significance at the 5% level 
We compare the likelihoods of the stepwise selected equation and the augmented model: 
Stepwise Selected Model 1: Prob{DP_CB_2i = 1} = Xi ) 
Augmented model 2: Prob{DP_CB_2i = 1} = Xi XiDi') where Di is a dummy variable defined 
hereafter (X = M6_LLR_IL, M6_BETA, M6_LLP_GL) 
We compute a LR statistic for the null of stability: LR = 2 [Log L2 – Log L1]. Under the null, LR is 
distributed as a (2). 
 
